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NUMBER 1

THE "ACTUAL CONTROVERSY" IN
DECLARATORY ACTIONS
JoHN

A.

SCHROTH, JR.

That recently enacted Act of Congress which appends to the Judicial Code a new section authorizing the courts of the United States to
grant declaratory judgments1 brings this form of proceeding once
more into prominence. The Act possesses much interest merely as another step in the movement for the general adoption of the declaratory
action. Its greater interest, however, lies in the fact that the Act gives
a new importance to the attitude of the Supreme Court of the United
States toward the declaratory judgment. That form of procedure must
now justify itself finally and decisively before a tribunal which in the

past has found that it presented serious constitutional difficulties.
With the constitutionality of the new Act likely to be mooted, its
opening words which purport to limit the declaratory action to "cases
of actual controversy", become especially significant.2 This limiting
phrase is not an expression peculiar to the Act. It may, in fact, be
found in the declaratory judgment statutes of several states whose
courts have, as we shall presently see, invariably considered the phrase
the hall-mark of constitutionality. The inclusion of this limitation in
the federal statute must, therefore, be attributed solely to the desire to
obviate constitutional difficulties. These four words are thus expected
to bear successfully the brunt of the constitutional attack and to quiet
the scruples of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Whether or not that Court will find the phrase a convincing proof
of the Act's validity must, of course, remain for the present an open
question. Yet the mere presence of the formula in the Act, viewed in
the light of its purpose, kindles interest in its origin, its development
'H. R. REP. No. 343, 73d Cong., Serial No. 4337, "An Act to amend the Judicial Code by adding a new section to be numbered 274D." Approved, June 14,
1934.

'The first paragraph of the new Act, which contains the grant of power,
states: "In cases of actual controversy the courts of the United States shall have
power upon petition, declaration, complaint, or other appropriate pleadings to
declare rights and other legal relations of any interested party petitioning for
such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be prayed, and such
declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and be
reviewable as such."
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and, above all, its meaning. Closely connected with these questions and
of more interest to those who favor the extension of this new type of
action is the problem of this limitation's effect upon the usefulness of
the declaratory action. Many of these queries cannot be met with categorical answers. Yet a survey of certain doctrines, pertaining to the
propriety of the declaratory judgment, which have been advanced by
state courts and by the United States Supreme Court will aid in defining the problems inhering in the phrase, in presenting the issues,
and in suggesting possible solutions.
In essaying this task, we must begin with a clear understanding of
the doctrines, hostile to the declaratory action, which have been advanced in the past. To attain such an understanding we must, in turn,
call to mind the essential nature of this type of procedure. At the outset it cannot be too strongly insisted that declaratory judgments are
judgments in every sense of that term. They presuppose parties with
substantial adverse interests and a legal contest concerning rights or
other legal relationships. The declaratory judgment, moreover, constitutes a final judgment, subject only to appeal. As res judicata it
forever binds the parties to the action in respect to the matters litigated
and determined. The declaration, therefore, resembles in many respects the ordinary or executory 3 judgment. The declaratory judgment differs from the latter, however, in that it can be granted before
a wrong has either occurred or been threatened. This difference arises
forthwith from the principal purpose of declaratory relief. That form
of proceeding constitutes a remedy for doubt and insecurity. It represents a variety of preventive relief, designed to stabilize jural relationships which have become clouded with uncertainty, thus avoiding the
wrongs and threatened wrongs which frequently spring from such
situations of uncertainty.
Precisely at this point of divergence between the executory and
declaratory actions looms the constitutional objection which has been
advanced to the latter proceedings. In 1920 the Supreme Court of
Michigan declared the declaratory statute of that state unconstitutional
in Anway v. Grand Rapids Railway Company.4 Most of the constitutional difficulties advanced by this discursive opinion resulted from
a complete misunderstanding of the declaratory judgment. If these be
cast aside, the court's remaining objections find their basis in the simple fact that such proceedings involve no wrong or threateied wrong.
'Under the term, "executory action", as herein used, must be classified all ac-

tions which are designed to redress wrongs already committeed or prevent those
immediately threatened.
'2II Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350 (1920).
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From this circumstance, the Michigan tribunal deduced that declaratory actibns state no "cause of action" and, therefore, present no actual
controversy. The absence of a cause of action, in the court's opinion,
rendered the issues presented in declaratory proceedings moot or fictitious and consequently non-justiciable. On these premises, the court
declared the declaratory judgment statute void as an attempt to confer
upon the courts of Michigan a power other than the judicial.
The objection thus stated by the Michigan court has received the
concurrence of the Supreme Court of the United States. In Liberty
Warehouse Company z. Grannis,5 which involved an action against
the Commonwealth Attorney of the state of Kentucky for a declaration that a certain Kentucky statute violated the state and federal constitutions, the Court flatly denied the federal judiciary's competence to
take jurisdiction of a declaratory action. Mr. Justice Sanford speaking
for the Court, held that "while the Commonwealth Attorney is made
defendant as a representative of the Commonwealth, there is no semblance of any adverse litigation with him individually; there being
neither any allegation that the plaintiffs have done or contemplate doing any of the things forbidden by the Act before being advised by the
Court as to their rights, nor any allegation that the Commonwealth
Attorney has threatened to take or contemplates taking any action
against them for any violation of the Act, either past or prospective." 6
On these grounds, the Court decided that the matter before them constituted neither a case nor controversy to which the constitution extends the judicial power of the United States. Mr. Justice Brandeis,
speaking for the Court in Willing et al. v. Chicago Auditorium Association7 reiterated this doctrine in more concise language. This case
arose in an Illinois court when the Association, having cause to doubt
its own right to replace the structure then standing upon the land
which it had leased from Willing and others, sought a declaration of
rights. When certain of the defendants removed the case into a federal court, the question of that court's power to give declaratory relief
was raised and finally carried to the Supreme Court. The Court emphatically denied the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States to
grant declaratory judgments. It asserted that "the fact that plaintiff's
desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others, does
not confer a cause of action. No defendant has wronged the plaintiff or
has threatened to do so. Resort to equity to remove such doubts is a
proceeding which was unknown to either English or American courts
r273

6

U. S. 70, 47 Sup. Ct. 282

(1927).

1d. at 73, Sup. Ct. at 282-3.

7277

U. S. 274, 48 Sup. Ct. 507 (1928).
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at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and for more than half
a century thereafter." 8
According to both the Michigan and United States Supreme Courts,
therefore, a prayer for a declaration of rights, prior to the threat or
commission of a wrong, states no cause of action. Now a "cause of
action" may be defined as that aggregate of juristic facts which vests
in the plaintiff a right of action, i.e., a right to invoke the aid and protection of the judicial power. Consequently, when these courts maintain that a wrong or threat of wrong constitutes an essential element of
a cause of action, they embrace the proposition that the judicial power
can only redress wrongs already committed or prevent those immediately threatened. A theory of judicial power, therefore, lies at the base
of the arguments advanced against the declaratory judgment.
That theory appears to be subject to easy refutation. An examination of the functioin performed by the judicial power in the adjudication of cases reveals nothing which requires that power to remain inactive until a wrong or threat of wrong has occurred. Even in those
cases where an alleged wrong is to be redressed, the essence of the
judicial function can only be the declaration of rights. If, for example,
defendant B, in an action for damages, denies that plaintiff A possesses the right which B has allegedly infringed, the peculiar duty of
the judicial power must lie in declaring whether or not A has the right
thus controverted. If the court decides this question in A's favor, there
remains the inquiry whether or not the acts of B do, in truth, amount
to an infringement of that right. Briefly, in order to decide the issues
presented bythe case, the judicial power must first declare the existence
of the alleged right and its orbit or extent-both purely "declaratory
functions. Why, therefore, cannot the judiciary declare rights before a
wrong has been committed or threatened? Indeed, no one would maintain that the mere absence of a wrong or threat of wrong effects an
alteration in the judicial function, provided that the court is asked to
do no more than give an authoritative declaration of rights. The absence of a wrong or threat of wrong necessarily curtails the fact-finding activities of the court. This feature of such a proceeding, however,
affects the jury, not the judicial power, because the determination of
facts constitutes the jury's province. The judicial power, regarded as
a function of government, seems not, therefore, to require a wrong or
threatened wrong as a condition precedent to its action.
If we regard the judicial power in the light of its history, the theory
under discussion seems, at first blush, more formidable. None can
gainsay that originally the courts existed merely to redress wrongs.
Id. at 289, Sup. Ct. at 5o9.
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But neither can it be denied that the equitable, preventive activities of
the courts have steadily grown in importance. In order to take cognizance of these latter aspects of judicial power, the Michigan and
United States Supreme Courts have been forced to join threatened
wrongs to actual wrongs as constituting valid causes of action. This
admission, which indeed could not be avoided, seriously detracts from
the intellectual respectability of their theory. The judiciary, in enjoining a threatened wrong, acts to preserve the existing legal network
which binds man to man. But, if the courts may undertake to preserve,
as well as to restore, it seems difficult to understand what principle
requires the former function to be confined to cases of threatened
wrongs. What, moreover, constitutes a threat of wrong? At what
point does respondent's act assume the proportions of a threat? These
questions must always remain difficult to answer. Indeed, the limitation of the preventive jurisdiction of the courts to cases of threatened
wrongs places only the flimsiest of bridles upon that aspect of judicial
power. The concept of a threatened wrong can, in fact, be easily expanded in order to permit courts to grant, under the guise of injunction proceedings, something very like a declaratory judgment. 9 Hence,
while a theoretical distinction may be drawn between the grounds for
injunctive relief and those warranting only a declaration, in practice
the line must be shadowy and ill-defined.
But the inadequacy of the doctrine under discussion becomes even
more obvious when we reflect that certain long-established judicial
proceedings do not presuppose even a theoretical wrong or threat of
wrong. If the judicial power can operate only in the presence of a
wrong, actual or threatened, how are we to explain such traditional
actions as bills to remove clouds from title and interpleader? In the
former action, the mere existence of some legal instrument which casts
a cloud upon plaintiff's title constitutes grounds sufficient to enable
him to invoke the judicial power. In the latter, the plaintiff-stakeholder, having in his custody a thing of value to which other persons
assert conflicting claims, comes into court and, by forcing the contestants to litigate their claims, secures an authoritative determination of
their rights and his duty. In both, the mere existence of facts which
cast doubt upon plaintiff's rights and duties constitutes a cause of action entitling him to move the judicial power for a definitive declaration of rights.
The existence of these actions, in short, not only shows the inadequacy of the doctrine enunciated by the Michigan and United States
'See, e. g., Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. State of West Virginia, 262 U.
S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658 (1923).
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Supreme Courts, but indicates very clearly that declaratory actions
must be entirely within the competence of the judicial power. Hostile
claims or other facts which cast doubt upon a party's right and duties
constitute, in proceedings to remove clouds and interpleader, a valid
cause of action. Why may not such claims or facts become a cause of
action generally? The declaratory action constitutes, in fact, merely
an action to remove clouds from all legal relations and, therefore, an
extension, by analogy, of the principle underlying quia timet. The importance of land tenure in the social scheme and the consequent necessity for certainty in land titles produced, in the past, the bill to remove
clouds. The necessity for certainty in, and security of, all legal relationships in the complex society of today has led to a wider application
of the same remedy in the form of the declaratory judgment. Surely,
when courts have performed a function in particular cases for years, a
mere extension of that activity to new fields cannot jeopardize their
judicial chastity.
It appears, therefore, that a wrong or threatened wrong, an "actual
controversy" in the language of the Michigan Court, is not a prerequisite to the activity of the judicial power. In fact, the objection to
the declaratory judgment which finds its basis in the alleged absence
of a cause of action, springs from a very narrow, inadequate theory of
that power. The complete overthrow of such an objection requires
nothing more than an elucidation of the broader aspect of judicial
power and a reference to the traditional remedies, similar in principle
to the declaratory action, which have long been available before the
occurrence of a wrong or threatened wrong. Many state courts have,
however, avoided such a direct, frontal attack on the theory of judicial
power previously discussed, although they emphatically upheld the
constitutionality of the declaratory judgment. The Willing and Grannis cases have been swept aside by drawing a distinction between the
judicial power of the states and that of the United States. Thus we
are informed that the judicial power of the United States, either because it extends only to "cases" and "controversies"' 10 or because, be11
ing delegated power, it is fettered by the history of judicial power,
possesses limitations which forbid its granting declaratory judgments.
These vexatious restrictions the judicial powers of the several states
have, of course, providentially escaped.
With the federal cases thus cavalierly despatched, the Anway case
"Morton v. Pacific Construction Co., 36 Ariz. 97, 283 Pac. 28i (i93o) ; Bra-

mann v. Babcock, 98 Conn. 549, 12o AtI. i5o (1923) ; Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla.
782, 128 So. 258 (I93O) ; Miller v. Miller, i49 Tenn. 463, 261 S.W. 965 (1924).
"Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich. 673, 229 N. W. 618
(19p,).

ACTUAL CONTROVERSY
alone stood in the path of the declaratory judgment. Nevertheless,
many of the state courts have also been able to avoid a direct collision
with the doctrine of that case. In 1921-1922, when the legislatures of
California, Kansas, Kentucky and Virginia adopted declaratory judgment statutes, 12 they specifically limited the new proceedings to "cases
of actual controversy", thus purporting to obviate the objection of the
Michigan court that such action presented no actual controversy. This
expedient, as we have previously indicated, was eminently successful.
The supreme courts of those states, relying upon this phrase to distinguish the statutes before them from the Michigan statute, upheld the
constitutionality of the declaratory action.' s Moreover, the legislature
of Michigan, duly impressed with the efficacy of these four words, in4
serted them in the rejected 1919 statute and re-enacted the measure.'
Again the magic formula worked, for in 1930 the Supreme Court of
Michigan sustained the act, rejoicing that the inclusion of the phrase
prevented the courts of Michigan from becoming "a fountain of legal
advice to fill the cups of loitering wayfarers."' 15
Meanwhile, in 1925, the case of In re Kariher'sPetition,6 challenging the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania declaratory judgment act,
came before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. At that time, the
Supreme Courts of California and Kansas had already sustained their
respective declaratory judgment acts, 17 making, as we have noted,
specific mention of the fact that those acts, unlike the Michigan Act
of 1919, were applicable only in "cases of actual controversy." The
Pennsylvania statute made no reference to "actual controversies".
The Pennsylvania court, however, did not hesitate to remedy this alleged defect by declaring, in the Kariher case, that the court would not
grant a declaratory judgment unless satisfied that an "actual controversy" existed between the parties. In New York State, the Supreme
Court, Monroe County, essayed a similar task of judicial legislation.
Although the New York declaratory judgment act' 8 contained no
"CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1923) § io6o; KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923)
§ 60-3127; Ky. CODES ANN. (Carrol, i927) Civil Prac. § 639; VA. CODE ANN.
(Michie, i93o) § 614oa.
"Blakeslee v. Wilson, i9o Cal. 479, 213 Pac. 495 (1923); Hopkins v. Grove,

lo9 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82 (i921) ; Patterson's Executors v. Patterson, 144 Va.
113, 131 S. E. 217 (1926).
"(I919, re-enacted 1929) MicH. CoMP. LAws (1929) § 13903.

'Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore, supra note ii, at 676,
at 61g.
"284 Pa. 455, 131 AtI. 265 (1925).
"Blakeslee v. Wilson; Hopkins v. Grove, both =pra note 13.
IN. Y. C. P. RuLns § 212.

229

N. W.
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mention of an "actual controversy", the court maintained that the
"constitutionality of .

.

. a declaratory judgment, where an actual

controversy exists... is not open to question."' 19
This line of doctrine has now received the approval of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Nashville, Chattanoogaand St. Louis
Ry. Co. v. Wallace.20 The case arose when the railway company, alleging that a certain taxing measure of the State of Tennessee conflicted with the United States Constitution, brought a declaratory action against the comptroller of the state treasury in a chancery court
of that state. The judgment of the chancery court sustaining the constitutionality of the tax had been affirmed, on appeal, by the Supreme
Court of Tennessee, whence it was carried, by writ of error, to the
United States Supreme Court. The Court, after hearing argument on
the question "whether a case or controversy is present in view of the
nature of the proceedings in the State Court," decided that the matter
before them was entirely justiciable and affirmed the judgment of the
state courts.
The opinion lays down a general test of justiciability. The Court
announced that the mere novelty of the proceedings presented no difficulties because "the Constitution does not require that the case or
controversy should be presented by traditional forms of procedure, invoking only traditional remedies. .. ,1 On the contrary, the substance
of the proceedings must be scrutinized before its justiciability can be
established. The case must, in truth, retain "the essentials of an ad22
versary proceeding involving a real, not hypothetical, controversy."
If the case does, in fact, present a "real controversy", the judicial
power may act upon it, irrespective of its procedural form. It necessarily followed that a declaratory action possesses all the attributes of justiciability, if it involves a "real controversy".
Thus, the constitutional debate respecting the declaratory judgment
has come to rest at the same point in the federal courts as in those of
many of the states. The limitation of declaratory actions to cases of
actual or real controversy may be regarded as the final result of the
doctrine of the Grannis, Willing and Anway cases. Yet, if the requirement of an actual controversy as a condition precedent to declaratory
relief be a result of those doctrines, it is, most emphatically, not their
conclusion. The constitutional issues raised by those cases live on, hid"Board of Education v. Van Zandt, iig Misc. 124, 127, 195 N. Y. S. 297, 300
(1922).
"288

U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345 (1933).
11d. at 264, Sup. Ct. at 619.
=Ibid.
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den in the limiting phrase which they produced. In truth, the phrase
"cases of actual controversy", whether placed in the declaratory judgment statutes by the legislatures or read into them by the courts, brings
to the fore an all-important problem, the problem of the phrase's
meaning and of its effect upon'the usefulness of the declaratory action,
It will not be forgotten that when the Michigan court declared the
declaratory action void as presenting no "actual controversy", it meant
that such proceedings did not necessarily involve a wrong or threat of
wrong. To the court, the term "actual controversy" retained its common-law meaning, broadened sufficiently to embrace within its scope
actions for injunctive relief. The natural inference would, therefore,
be that when legislatures and courts limited the declaratory action to
cases of actual controversy, for the sole purpose of removing the constitutional difficulties raised by the Anway case, they intended to make
the remedy available only in cases involving wrongs or threatened
wrongs. We should, in fact, be justified in concluding that the attempt
to establish a new type of preventive relief had been abandoned and
that the declaratory judgment was to become merely a milder alternative remedy for wrongs and a means of providing additional judicial
relief for threatened wrongs.
Whether or not the term, "real controversy", as used in the Wallace
case, actually places such limitations on the declaratory judgment remains an open question, because the Court has not vouchsafed a definition of the phrase. Yet, one passage in the opinion points to the conclusion that the Court does consider a wrong or threatened wrong an
essential element of a "real controversy." In affirming its ability to
take jurisdiction of that case, the Court took care to limit the scope of
its decision. The Court, in fact, recognized that the railway company
might have brought its suit in the form of a proceeding for injunction. The opinion, consequently, declared "the narrow question presented for determination is whether the controversy before us, which
would be justiciable in this Court if presented in a suit for injunction,
is any less so because through a modified procedure appellant has been
permitted to present it in the State courts without praying for an injunction or alleging that irreparable injury will result from the collection of the tax." 2 3 The considerations thus set forth may well have
been decisive with the Court. Perhaps the Court intended to say no
more than that declaratory actions possess justiciability whenever they
involve threats of wrong or, we may confidently add, wrongs. Under
this view, the "real controversy" mentioned in the opinion constitutes
a controversy involving a wrong or threatened wrongs. These specula"Supra note 21, at 262, Sup.

Ct. at 618.
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tions would lead to the conclusion that the Wallace case does not, after
all, overthrow the doctrines of the Grannisand Willing cases.
The meaning to be attached to the term, "actual controversy," as
used in the state statutes and by the state courts does not, however,
offer so fertile a field for speculation. The legislatures of Kansas and
Virginia have given content to the phrase by incorporating in their
declaratory judgment acts 24 the definitive expression, "actual antagonistic assertion and denial of right." Cases of actual controversy,
therefore, are, within the meaning of the statutes, cases of "actual
antagonistic assertion and denial of right." In similar vein, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, when called upon to explain the nature
of the "actual controversy" which it had declared an essential prerequisite to declaratory relief, stated that such a controversy appears
when the differences between the parties have reached the stage of
antagonistic claims actively pressed on one side and opposed on the
other.2 5 In brief, under both definitions the term "actual controversy"
means a verbal dispute over rights.
No painstaking analysis will be required to show that both definitions attach a meaning to the words "actual controversy" considerably
different from that intended by the Michigan court. Neither of the new
meanings makes a wrong or threatened wrong an essential element of
an "actual controversy." Quite obviously, the conception of an "actual
controversy" presented by the Anway case is narrower than that implied in the words, "actual antagonistic assertion and denial of right"
or "antagonistic claims actively pressed and opposed." Thus, the legislatures and the courts, while adopting the words of the Michigan
court, rejected its meaning. By broadening the conception of an "actual controversy," they have made the declaratory action something
more than a mere alternative remedy for wrongs and an additional
remedy for threatened wrongs. That procedure, although limited to
cases of actual controversy, can be employed in any dispute, in any
case of "actual antagonistic assertion and denial of right," whether a
wrong or threat of wrong has occurred or not.
Yet the mere fact that Anway v. Grand Rapids Railway Coinpanv
directly or indirectly caused the limitation of declarations to "cases of
actual controversy" suffices to prove its importance. Although the narrow definition of the phrase employed in that case has been repudiated,
the phrase in itself guarantees that the reasoning therein expressed
and the conception of judicial power therein entertained will continue
to limit the usefulnes of the declaration. In truth, the alteration in the
'Supra note

12.

'In re Cryan's Estate, 3or Pa. 386, i5z AtI. 675 (1931).
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meaning of "actual controversy" does not touch the underlying argument of the Anway case. The Michigan court considered executory
actions as the only appropriate occasions for an exercise of judicial
power. The phrase, "actual controversy," even with its new meaning,
seeks to model the declaration after the executory action.
The truth of this assertion becomes apparent upon examination of
this new definition of a "controversy." An "actual antagonistic assertion and denial of right," the statutory formula, and the phraseology
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, "antagonistic claims... actively pressed and opposed," possessed substantially the same meaning.
To satisfy either definition, there must be affirmative action by both
parties. According to the statutory phrase, the "actual" assertion of
right must be met by an "actual" denial. Under the doctrine of the
Pennsylvania court, the "antagonistic claims" must be actively opposed
as well as pressed. It follows, in strict logic, that plaintiff A cannot
secure a declaration of his rights unless defendant B has denied them,
or, to use the Pennsylvania formula, has actively opposed them. It is,
therefore, an act of the defendant B, i.e., his denial of right or active
opposition, which vests in the plaintiff A, a right of action. Thus, defendant's behaviour constitutes an essential element of the cause of
26

action.

The resemblance between such a cause of action and those which
give rise to executory actions becomes at once apparent. The right to
sue for damages, for example, does not vest until defendant has committed a tort. An injunction cannot be secured unless defendant has
threatened a wrongful act. Detinue can be maintained only when defendant wrongfully refuses to relinquish possession of a chattel. Defendant's wrongful taking, coupled with refusal to return, constitutes
grounds for replevin. In all such actions, defendant's behaviour, his
wrongful act, constitutes an indispensable element of the cause of action. In declaratory actions limited to cases of "actual controversy,"
defendant's denial of right or opposing claims, although not a wrong
in the technical sense, comes to occupy a very similar position in the
aggregate of facts which bestows a right of action upon the plaintiff.
Thus, by virtue of this limitation, the declaratory action becomes, like
the executory, a remedy for an act of the defendant.
No one can deny that defendant's behaviour, his wrongful acts,
'Thus, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has announced that, in declaratory actions, it will not decide questions which are not controverted. In re
Brown's Estate, 289 Pa. 101, 137 Atl. 132 (x927). And to controvert means "to
dispute; to deny; to oppose or contest; to take issue on". Reese v. Adamson, 297
Pa. 13, i6, 146 Atl. 262, 263 (1929).
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must condition the right to bring an executory action. That result
flows, logically, from the purpose which those actions seek to fulfill.
The purpose of an ordinary action for damages, for example, is to give
compensation for an injury, i.e., for defendant's wrongful act. Manifestly, defendant's wrongful act must, in that case, constitute an element of the cause of action, for plaintiff has no right to damages without it. The same principle applies to other executory actions, such as
replevin, specific performance, injunction proceedings, etc. The redress of a wrongful act, or the prevention of one immediately threatened, constitutes their entire purpose and effect. If that wrong has not
been committed, or threatened, the remedy, being patently inappropriate, remains unavailable to the plaintiff.
There can be no reason, however, for applying the same principle
to the declaratory action. A declaration does not purport to be solely
a remedy for a particular kind of behaviour. Itfis designed neither to
force defendant to act, nor to restrain him from acting, nor yet to levy
damages upon him for a tort. On the contrary, the declaratory judgment seeks merely to quiet doubtful legal relationships. The authoritative determination of uncertain legal relations constitutes its salient
function, irrespective of the source of the uncertainty. Consequently,
the very purpose of the procedure demands that any circumstance
which casts substantial doubt upon the plaintiff's rights or other jural
relations shall constitute a sufficient cause of action, provided only that
there be some party of adverse interest against whom the action may
be brought. The emphasis should, therefore, lie upon the existence of
an uncertainty in legal relationships rather than upon a hostile word
or deed of the opposing party.
No one can deny that defendant's behaviour may be the circumstance or fact which renders plaintiff's rights uncertain. When a defendant, having the requisite legal interest, denies plaintiff's rights or
actively presses a claim antagonistic to them, it cannot be disputed that
doubt has been cast upon those rights and that declaratory relief has
become manifestly appropriate. But doubts, equally substantial and
consequently equally sufficient to warrant a declaration, may arise with
respect to plaintiff's rights although defendant has remained completely inactive both in deed and word. Ambiguities in contracts, wills, or
leases may cast harassing doubt upon one party's rights although the
other party has never actually asserted the antagonistic claims which
the ambiguities seem to warrant. A single example will prove sufficiently illustrative. A has possession of a parcel of land under the terms
of a will, but ambiguous provisions thereof make it doubtful whether
he holds a fee or merely a life estate with a remainder interest in B. In
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such a case, the fact that B did not deny A's right of full ownership
would not relieve that right of the burden of doubt. On the contrary,
the mere existence of the ambiguity constitutes a serious danger to A's
full enjoyment of his rights because it reveals a basis for an attack on
those rights. Thus, in this case, the ambiguity itself presents an adequate cause of action for declaratory relief, whether B actually denies
A's rights or not.
It is in this respect that the similarity between the declaratory action, given its proper scope, and the bill quia timet appears. An "actual controversy", whether in the sense in which that term was used in
the Anway case or in the sense of the statutes and the Cryan case,2 0a
has never been a condition precedent to relief by a bill quia timet. The
maintenance of the suit depends, in no wise, upon defendant's behaviour either by word or deed. On the contrary, the bill seeks merely
to "quiet" title by removing "clouds" which prejudice that title. A
"cloud" in legal parlance, is a semblance of title, either legal or equitable, or a claim of interest in land. Hence the proceeding is aimed at a
particular instrument or piece of evidence which is dangerous to plain27
tiff's rights and which may be ordered to be destroyed.
The mere existence of such a "cloud", therefore, constitutes a sufficient "cause of action" to warrant this type of relief, although no one
has actually disputed the complainant's title. Indeed, the mere fact
that a person had verbally disputed complainant's title, did not, in the
absence of a "cloud", give a right of action under the ancient rule of
equity. In many jurisdictions, however, the long-established bill quia
timet has been supplemented by a statutory action to determine adverse claims. 28 This statutory action will lie whenever a right, hostile
to complainant's title, has been asserted, whether the asserted right be
founded upon evidence, i.e., upon a "cloud" or not. Thus, an owner of
realty has two remedies available for the purpose of quieting his title.
If doubt be cast upon his title by the existence of a legal instrument
hostile thereto, he may bring a bill quia timet and have the cloud removed, although no one verbally disputes his title. On the other hand,
if some one disputes his title, he may resort to the courts in proceedings for the determination of adverse claims and force the disputant to
submit the matter to adjudication.
Under similar circumstances, the declaratory action, given its proper scope, affords the same protection to legal relations generally. A
declaration is a remedy appropriate, not only in cases of "actual conNaSupra note 25.
' WALsH ox EQUITY, (Ist.
'Id. at 542.

ed.

1930) 541.
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troversy," but also in cases of substantial doubt or uncertainty. Whenever substantial doubt exists with respect to rights, a declaration
should be granted whether or not that doubt has its origin in assertions of adverse claims, in the ambiguous phraseology of written instruments, or merely in operative facts which, de facto, render the
rights of plaintiff insecure. In declaratory proceedings, therefore, the
court need not inquire whether or not the suit grows out of an "actual
controversy." It need only ascertain that defendant has "a true interest
to oppose the declaration sought," 29 and that the jural relations between the parties are in such a state of uncertainty as to require stabilization. If such a situation exists, it becomes the duty of the court to
throw around that relationship the protection of res judicata.
Perhaps the most concise statement of the proper scope to be given
the declaratory judgment has been vouchsafed by the Court of Appeals of New York. In James v. Alderton Dockyards ° the court
pointed out that "the general purpose of the declaratory judgment is
to serve some practical end in quieting or stabilizing an uncertain or
disputed jural relationship either as to present or prospective obligations."' Thus, the Court of Appeals acknowledged the declaratory
judgment's dual purpose. Viewing the declaration as a remedy designed to stabilize jural relationships, it recognized that logically such
relief must be made available, not only in cases of dispute, but in cases
of uncertainty. Hence, the court did not hesitate to pronounce the declaratory judgment an appropriate remedy for both types of cases. In
so doing, the Court of Appeals not only defined, concisely, the declaration's proper scope but indicated its own belief that the courts can
constitutionally undertake to quiet, not only title, but all jural relationships whatsoever.
The issue thus raised, being simply whether the declaration shall be
modelled upon the executory action or whether it shall follow the principles of quia timet, will gain precision if examined in the light of a
few representative cases in which declaratory relief has been granted.
Perhaps the most striking fact revealed by a survey of the cases is the
frequency with which declarations have been either substituted for
executory actions8 2 or demanded in conjunction therewith.3 3 In the
'Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v. British Bank for Foreign Trade,
[1921] 2 A. C. 438.

I°z56 N. Y. 298, 176 N. E. 401 (1931).
'Id. at 305, 176 N. E. at 4o4; cf. Bramann v. Babcock, supranote io.
Bramann v. Babcock, supra note io.
'Blakeslee v. Wilson, 19o Cal. 479, 213 Pac. 495 (1923) ; Stueck v. Murphy,
1O7 Conn. 656, i42 Atl. 3Ol (1928) ; Johnson v. Mortenson, 1lO Conn. 221, 147
At. 705 (1929) ; Miller v. Siden, 259 Mich. 19, 242 N. W. 823 (1932) ; Naugle
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former class of cases, the plaintiff had a cause of action, in the usual
sense of that term, for damages, 34 an injunction, 35 or other coercive
relief,36 but contented himself with the milder and less cumbersome
declaration. In the latter class, the plaintiffs combined a prayer for a
declaration with a demand for coercive relief in order to take advantage of the fact that courts will frequently grant a declaration of rights
although they dismiss the prayer for coercive relief on technical
grounds.3 7 In both types of cases, an "actual controversy" exists in
the strictest sense of that term, i.e., a controversy centering around a
wrong or threatened wrong. In such causes, the courts need not, or
do not, demand an "assertion and denial of right," for the conflict between the parties appears on the face of the proceedings. Thus in a
v. Banmann, 96 N. J. Eq. 183, 125 At. 489 (1924); Hewitt v. Camden Co., 7
N. J. Misc. 528, 146 At. 881 (1929) ; St. John's Baptist Society v. Ukranian
Nat'l. Assn., io5 N. J. Eq. 69, 146 Atl. 886 (1929) ; Leibowitz v. Bickford Lunch
System, 241 N. Y. 489, ,5o N. E. 525 (I926) ; Bareham v. City of Rochester, 246
N. Y. 140, I58 N. E. 5I (1927) ; Pathe Exchange v. Cobb, 202 App. Div. 450,
195 N. Y. S. 66I (3d Dept. 1927) ; Loesch v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 128 Misc.

218 N. Y. S. 412 (1927) ; Allen v. Carstead Realty Co., 133 Misc. 359, 231
N. Y. S. 585 (1929) ; National City Bank v. Waggoner, 23o App. Div. 88, 243
N. Y. S. 299 (ist Dept. i93o) ; James v. Alderton Dockyards, 256 N Y. 298,
,76 N. E. 4oi (193I); Pratter v. Lascoff, 140 Misc. 211, 249 N. Y. S. 211
(i93) ; Wingate v. Flynn, 139 Misc. 79, 249 N. Y. S. 351 (1931) ; Cupp Grocery Co. v. City of Johnston, 288 Pa. 43, 135 Atl. 6io (I27) ; Evans Co. v.
Baldridge, 294 Pa. I42, 144 Atl. 97 (1928) ; Malley v. American Indemnity Corp.,
297 Pa. 216, 146 Atl. 571 (1929).
'Siegel v. Wise, 114 Conn. 297, I58 Atl. 891 (1932) ; Sternburger v. Tunison,
92 N. J. Eq. i59, iii
AtL 3o9 (192o) ; Union Trust Co. v. Goerke Co., io3 N.
J. Eq. 159, I42 Atl. 56o (1928) ; Butterick Pub. Co. v. Fulton & Elm Leasing
Co., 132 Misc. 366, 229, N. Y. S. 86 (I928) ; Baumann v. Baumann, 25o N. Y.
382, I65 N. E. 819 (1929) ; Ogden v. Riverview Holding Co., 134 Misc. 129, 234
N. Y. S. 147 (i929) ; Sloan v. Longcope, 288 Pa. i96, 135 At. 7,7 (1927).
"Blakeslee v. Wilson; Stueck v. Murphy; Johnson v. Mortenson; Leibowitz
v. Bickford Lunch System; Loesch v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co.; Allen v. Carstead Realty Corp.; National City Bank v. Waggoner; James v. Alderton Dockyards; Malley v. American Indemnity Corp., all supra note 32.
'St. John's Baptist Soc. v. Ukranian Nat'l. Assn.; Bareham v. City of Rochester; Pathe Exchange v. Cobb; Pratter v. Lascoff; Cupp Grocery Co. v. City
of Johnston; Evans Co. v. Baldridge, all supra note 32.
'Miller v. Siden (replevin) ; Naugle v. Baumann (foreclosure) ; Hewitt v.
Camden Co. (ejectment) ; Wingate v. Flynn (mandamus), all supra note 32.
"As, for example, Baumann v. Baumann, supra note 33, where plaintiff asked
a declaration that she was the wife of one of the defendants and that the Mexican divorce secured by that defendant was void. She also asked the court to enjoin the defendants from living together as man and wife. The court granted the
declaration but refused the injunctive relief prayed. Cf. Siegel v. Wise, supra
note 33.
232,
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very large number of cases the courts are not required to consider the
problem here under discussion.
A second class of cases, but slightly larger than the first, comprises
cases of "actual controversy" in the modified sense connoted by the
words, "assertion and denial of right." In all such cases, a dispute
over rights or other jural relationships had occurred between the
parties and the plaintiff invoked the judicial power to resolve this
controversy. In none had plaintiff a cause of action for coercive relief, although in some, involving negative declarations, a right of
action had vested in the defendant. This group of cases, therefore,
represents the use of the declaratory judgment as a form of preventive relief in controversies which have only reached the stage of
a verbal dispute.
The disputes thus submitted to the courts are many and varied.
The terms of leases, wills, deeds and contracts constitute matters
particularly susceptible to dispute and, therefore, may be readily
adjudicated in declaratory proceedings even when the declaration
is limited to "cases of actual controversy." We are not here concerned with the variety of situations in which declaratory relief has
been given. Instead, we confine ourselves to the problems centering
around the phrase "actual controversy." To give an account of each
case would, therefore, be more wearisome than enlightening. It
seems more profitable to essay a classification of the cases and to
treat only the most representative cases of each class.
Although the mass of declaratory actions involving "assertions
and denials of right" presents considerable resistance to a logical
classification, one group, composed of negative declaratory actions,
may be segregated from the remainder with ease. The salient feature of all these cases lies in the fact that a cause of action for coercive relief has already vested in the defendant. The plaintiff (prospective defendant), therefore, sues, not to establish a right in himself, but to secure a judgment declaring that he owes no duty to the
defendant (prospective plaintiff). Thus, the plaintiff asks the court
to declare that the defendant has not, in actual fact, a remedial right
to coercive relief against him.
An excellent example of such a negative declaratory judgment
may be found in the case of McCrory Stores Corporationv. Braunstein, Inc.3 8 The plaintiff corporation occupied a certain store as

lessee of Braunstein, Inc. The lease between the parties provided
that the lessee should "pay all the increases in taxes on and after
October 27, 1920." The taxes for i92o, which, although levied beo2 N. J. Law 59o, 134 AtI. 752 (1926).
3
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fore, fell due after October 27, I92O, were substantially higher than
those of 1919. The defendant, therefore, demanded that McCrory
Stores Corporation pay that increase, pointing to the lease provision. The latter, alleging that the terms of the lease required it to
pay only the increases in taxes levied after the stated date, refused
and brought a declaratory action against Braunstein, Inc. The facts
of the case, therefore, make it clear that the defendant had a right
to sue the plaintiff for damages arising from the alleged breach of
the lease. Plaintiff lessee's entire purpose in bringing the action was
to terminate the controversy and to protect itself from future litigation. 39
Although the plaintiff seeking such a negative declaration has not
been injured by the defendant, the relation between the parties obviously constitutes an actual controversy in the strict sense of that
term. Hence, while plaintiff's right of action is derived from the
fact that defendant has asserted a right against him and, therefore,
the action arises from an "assertion and denial of right," yet such
negative declaratory actions remain but executory actions with the
parties reversed. The mere fact that the parties come before the
court in capacities different from those which they would occupy in
an executory proceeding does not alter the nature of the controversy
between them. Thus, this type of declaratory action has an appearance of novelty, but actually requires the courts to perform nothing
more than they have done from time immemorial-namely, adjudicate controversies growing out of wrongful acts.
We turn now to those controversies which involve merely ail
"assertion and denial of right" and nothing more. A clear-cut example of such a controversy may be found in Aaron v. Woodcock. 40 The plaintiff had leased a certain property from the defendant for ten years. Under the terms of the lease, the rent was set at
$60o per month for the ten-year period with a proviso that the lessee should have the "privilege of re-leasing. . . (the property) at
the yearly rental of $7,200 payable monthly at $6oo per month." At
the expiration of the original lease, the lessee sought to exercise his
option. During the ensuing negotiation, a controversy arose between the parties, the lessee asserting that he had a right to a new
ten-year lease and the lessor alleging that the above proviso en'Cf. Cloverdale Union High School District v. Peters, 88 Cal. App. 731, 264
Pac. 273 (1928) ; Town of Greece v. Murray, 130 Misc. 55, 223 N. Y. S. 6o6
(1927) ; Sartorius v. Cohen, 249 N. Y. 31, 162 N. E. 575 (1928) ; Ufa Films v.
Ufa Eastern Div., 134 Misc. 129, 234 N. Y. S.147 (1929).
"283 Pa. 33, 128 Atl. 665 (1925).
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titled the lessee to a one-year re-lease only. This dispute the court resolved by a declaration in favor of the defendant, before a wrong
41
had been committed by either party.

The same type of controversy is presented by Brokaw v. Fairchild
et al.42 The plaintiff had a life-estate under a will, in a certain property upon which stood an old-fashioned, brown-stone residence. Plaintiff wished to demolish this building and erect an apartment house on
the property, but the remaindermen denied his right to do so, alleging that the demolition would constitute waste. Brokaw, thereupon,
brought the action for a declaration of his right to destroy the old
structure and erect the new.43 Here again, the controversy between the
parties involved nothing more than an "assertion and denial of right."
Another class of cases in which the declaratory judgment has been
widely used involves restrictions on the use of property. Usually such

cases present controversies concerning the validity either of restrictive
provisions in deeds 44 or of easements4 5 or zoning ordinances. 4 6 The

plaintiffs in these cases desired to use their property in a manner forbidden by the restrictive clauses, while the defendants not only denied

their right to disregard the provisions, but also threatened suit. The
controversies, therefore, possessed an indubitable reality and, unless

settled by a declaration, seemed likely to result in future suits for
executory relief.
It must be quite clear that in all the cases previously discussed, the
interests of the parties to the controversy were distinctly adverse. In
many of them, 4 7 one of the parties could have availed himself of an
"Similar controversies involving leases: Braun v. McLaughlin Co., 93 Cal.
App. 1I6, 269 Pac. 191 (1928); McFadden v. Lick Pier Co., ioi Cal. App. 12,
281 Pac. 429 (1928); Wright v. Wright Mining & Royalty Co., 137 Kan. 619,
21 P. (2d) 350 (933)
; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Levin, 128 Misc. 838,
221 N. Y. S. 269 (1927); Simkin v. Blum, 131 Misc. 365, 226 N. Y. S. 7o2
(1928) ; Bard v. Columbia University Club, 243 N. Y. 6o9, 171 N.E. 8o3 (i93o).
135 Misc. 70, 237 N. Y. S. 6 (I92p).
"Similar controversies involving wills: Dodge v. Campbell, 128 Misc. 778, 22o
N. Y. S. 262 (1927) ; B'nai Braith Orphanage v. Roberts, 284 Pa. 26, 13o Atl.
298 (i925); In re Brown's Estate, 289 Pa. ioi, 137,Atl. 132 (1927); In re
Kidd's Estate, 293 Pa. 21, 141 AtI. 644 (x928) ; In re Cryan's Estate, 3oi Pa.
386, 152 Atl. 675 (i93I).
"Satterthwait v. Gibbs, 288 Pa. 428, 135 AUt. 862 (i927) ; Brown v. Levin,
295 Pa. 530, 145 Atl. 593 (1929) ; Henry v. Eves, 3o6 Pa. 25o, i59 At. 857
(i93i).

"Rochex & Rochex, Inc. v. Southern Pacific Co., 128 Cal. App. 474, 17 P. (2d)
794 (1932) ; Garvin & Co. v. Lancaster Co., 290 Pa. 448, 139 Atl. i54 (927).
"Taylor v. Haverford Township, 299 Pa. 4o2, 149 Atl. 639 (1930).
"Cases cited supra notes 32, 33, 38, and 39.
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executory action. In the remainder,48 although no "cause of action,"
in the ordinary sense, had accrued, the dispute between parties unless
resolved by a declaration must inevitably have led to litigation. Thus,
these causes wear all, or nearly all, of the panoply of legal warfare.
A few cases of "assertions and denials of right" do not, however,
appear to involve actual hostility between the original parties to the
controversy. In this category must be placed In re Kariher'sPetition.49 In that case, three persons who claimed to be owners in fee of
a certain farm negotiated a lease for quarrying the sub-surface limestone thereof. The proposed lessee, after examining the wills under
which the three lessors claimed, declined to take, asserting that one of
the lessors had only a life-estate, not a fee simple. The lessor whose
right was thus denied brought an action against the lessee and the alleged remaindermen for a declaration of rights. An analogous situation may be found in the case of In re Smith's Petition.0 There the
children of one Mrs. Bennett, claiming to own a parcel of land by
virtue of their mother's will, contracted to sell the property to the
petitioner, Smith. A question then arose whether or not the will in
question actually gave the sellers a fee in the property. Smith asserted
that the sellers had merely a life-estate and, forthwith, instituted a declaratory action against them and other interested parties.
No one will deny that an "actual controversy", i.e., an "assertion
and denial of right," existed between the parties to both of these cases.
Neither can it be disputed, however, that strictly speaking the parties
to that controversy had no adverse interests. There is no evidence to
show that either Smith or the lessee in the Kariher case re3lly desired
to break their respective bargains. Nothing in the factual set-up of the
cases indicates that the respective "denials of right" were advanced as
a convenient means of upsetting those agreements. On the contrary,
the facts seem to show that both parties in each case actually desired
to consummate the bargains. The lessee in the Kariher case and the
buyer in the Smith case, however, wanted to be certain that the other
contracting parties actually had the legal right to make the respective
contracts. A defect in the titles of these latter parties would absolutely
vitiate the contracts. Prudence dictated, therefore, that the validity of
those titles be finally established before the contracts were consummated.
Consequently, it seems very apparent that both actions resulted
from a desire to settle dubitable legal relationships rather than from a
"'Cases cited supra notes

4

Supra note 16.

'291 Pa. 129,

139

Atl.

40

to 46 inclusive.

832 (1927).
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"controversy." The parties who "denied" the respective rights had no
actual interest in securing the overthrow of those rights. The parties
who had a true interest in "denying" the rights of the alleged owners,
i.e., those parties who might claim remainder interests, did not, in fact,
dispute them. The controversy, the "assertion and denial of rights,"
constituted in both cases a mere formality. The actions represented, in
reality, applications of the principle of quia timet. Both Smith and
Kariher's proposed lessee denied the rights of their respective opposing parties because they feared to fulfill their contracts without an
authoritative adjudication of those rights. Each desired a judgment
which would banish his fears by determining finally the exact legal
relationship between the other party to his contract and those third
parties who might have an interest in the property, as remaindermen.
The Smith and Kariher cases, therefore, represent a kind of bill quia
timet disguised as an "actual controversy." 5' 1
The cases heretofore discussed show that the declaration may be
employed in four types of actions. In the first place, it may generally
be substituted for, or used as a supplement to, an executory action.
Secondly, the declaratory action in its negative form is available to a
prospective defendant against the party in whose favor a cause of action, in the ordinary sense, has accrued. Thirdly, it may be employed
to resolve actual, antagonistic disputes over jural relationships before
a wrong has been committed. Finally, the declaration will be granted
in order to quiet doubtful legal situations, if the matter can be cast in
the form of an "actual controversy." All these categories quite obviously fall within the scope of the term, "actual controversy."
The test of the net effect of the "actual controversy" requirement
upon the declaratory action, however, would come in those cases where
the plaintiff invoked the courts for a determination of doubtful jural
relationships before a controversy had arisen. In such cases, there
could be no "actual controversy," no "assertion and denial of right."
On the contrary, the plaintiffs would be merely harassed by doubts
concerning their rights and would bring the action under the principles
of quia timet, to have those doubts removed. The defendants in those
actions would be joined, not because they denied or controverted plaintiff's rights, but because they had interests adverse to the plaintiffs'
in the matter, i.e., because they had "a true interest to oppose the dec'Cf. State ex rel. Enright v. Kansas City, rio Kan. 6o3, 204 Pac. 69o (1922),
where plaintiff state law-officer denied defendant city's right to issue certain
bonds because of "ambiguities" in the governing statutes. Here, again, a declaration of rights was given in order to resolve a doubtful jural situation, with the
"actual controversy" amounting to little more than a formality.
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laration sought". 52 In such cases, the courts would be required to determine whether an "actual controversy" is an absolute prerequisite to
declaratory relief, or whether a substantial doubt or uncertainty will
suffice.
On the whole, the courts have not frequently faced this problem because the declaratory actions brought before them do, in fact, usually
involve some kind of dispute. Data, sufficient to warrant a dogmatic
answer to the question, cannot, therefore, be found. Yet the pertinent
cases do appear to indicate that the courts, following the strict logic of
the "actual controversy" requirement, deem a dispute essential to declaratory relief. In Wardrop Company v. Fairfield Gardens,5 3 a prospective purchaser of land had refused to complete the bargain because
he feared that certain restrictive covenants running with the land forbade his erecting a hospital upon it. The prospective vendor, in order
to remove this doubt, immediately brought an action against adjacent
property owners for a declaration that the covenants would not prevent the construction of a hospital. Because none of these defendants
had actually controverted the right claimed by the plaintiff, the court
declared that the case presented no real controversy, and refused a declaratory judgment.
The case of Di Fabio v. Southard,5 4 presents a somewhat similar
situation. There, the vendee of a house and lot refused to fulfill his
contract, asserting that the house in question did not comply with the
building restrictions of the subdivision in which it was located. The
owner of the property, joining only the adjacent property owners as
defendants, sought a declaratory judgment that the house complied
with the restrictions. The court refused the declaration on the ground
that the controversy existed between plaintiff and his vendee, not between plaintiff and the adjacent owners.
In Lyman v. Lyman,55 the absence of a dispute again prevented the
plaintiff from securing declaratory relief. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that a will, purporting to give him a life-estate in certain lands with the remainder to his heirs, operated legally to vest him
with a fee simple, by virtue of the rule of Shelley's Case. In bringing
his suit, he joined, as defendants, his living heirs, none of whom had
contested his claim. The court, advancing two major objections to
the case before them, refused declaratory relief. The first of these
found its basis in the fact that plaintiff's unborn children were unw'Supra note 29.
'237 App. Div. 605, 262 N. Y. S. 95 (Ist Dept. 1933).
Uio6 N. J. Eq. 157, 15o At. 248 (1930).
'293 Pa. 490, 143 AtI. 2oo (1928).
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represented. Since courts generally decline to grant declaratory judgments when all interested parties are not joined, no criticism can be
levied at the principle of this objection. The court's second objection
to the case, however, revolved around the absence of an actual controversy. The court deemed the case inappropriate for declaratory relief because neither the defendant heirs nor any prospective purchaser
had disputed plaintiff's claim. Thus, the absence of a controversy appeared to the court an insuperable barrier to relief by a declaration of
rights.
Upon the opposite side of the ledger must be entered the cases of
Trenton Saving Fund Society v. Wythman5 6 and Muskegon Heights
v. Danegelis,57 neither of which involved a controversy. In the former,
the complainant society asked a declaration of the effect of a certain
law regulating wills upon powers granted the society in its charter.
Under that charter, the society was authorized to keep a book in which
depositors might place the names of persons to whom their deposits
should be paid in the event of the depositors' dying intestate. The legislature of New Jersey had enacted a new "wills act", which, it was
alleged, conflicted with these charter provisions. The society brought
the declaratory action against three persons whose names appeared in
the book, simply to resolve the doubtful legal situation with no suggestion that any of the defendants had, in any way, controverted the
complainant's legal rights or advanced claims hostile thereto. Although
no controversy appeared on the record, the court granted the declaration sought.
In the second case, Muskegon Heights v. Danegelis, the plaintiff
city had issued bonds for poor-relief. A prospective purchaser questioned the power of the city under its charter to issue bonds for that
purpose. Thereupon, the city commenced this declaratory action
against two principal tax-payers, asking the court to declare the bonds
valid. Neither of these defendants had questioned the validity of the
bonds. The prospective buyer, and he alone, actually questioned the
city's authority to issue such bonds. Thus, as far as the proceedings
before the court are concerned, the action constituted merely an attempt to terminate an uncertainty rather than to resolve a controversy.
Nevertheless, the court sustained the use of the declaration under the
circumstances.
These cases possess, perhaps, less significance than a recitation of
their facts seems to warrant. The Wythman case arose in a court of
equity because complainant was held to be a trustee. The proceedings,
NIO4 N. J. Eq. 271, 145 Ati. 462 (1929).
"253 Mich. 260, 235 N. W. 83 (1931).
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therefore, bore a resemblance to a trustee's bill for advice. This similarity might well have been the underlying reason for the court's
granting the declaration, although. no dispute had arisen between the
parties. 58 The force of the Danegelis case is also weakened by the fact
that the court seemed to consider the case very unusual. Indeed, it felt
the necessity for justifying the use of the declaration under the circumstances. Thus, the tribunal pointed out that "under former practise a friendly suit would have been brought, entertained and right in
the matter adjudicated." 59 Moreover, the questions involved were "of
great public moment" and, consequently, the declaratory action "must
be permitted to serve in this instance." 60 The conclusion seems inescapable that the court had no intention of opening wide its doors to
non-controversial declaratory actions. It seems rather to have regarded this type of case as a kind of exception to the general rule.
It must be obvious that, were the declaration administered under
the principles of the bill to remove clouds, all the cases mentioned
above would be deemed appropriate for declaratory relief. In those
cases, the declaratory judgment, by banishing the plaintiffs' doubts, by
casting around their rights the protection of res judicata, would have
converted uncertainty into security. The plaintiffs would, in fact, have
been given authoritative decisions under the cover of which they could
have exercised their rights, unharassed by possible hostile claims.
Briefly stated, the respective judgments would have removed the
clouds on the plaintiffs' rights. The achievement of such results constitutes the salient purpose of the declaratory action. Yet the cases
were treated as improper for declaratory relief. The plaintiffs were
informed they could expect no aid from the judicial power until they
joined, as defendant someone who had disputed their claims of right.
The courts thus closed their eyes to the uncertainty in legal relationships revealed by the facts of the cases and saw only the absence of a
dispute between the parties. The final result was that the cases came
to nought, with the consequent waste of time and money.
The serious results of the "actual controversy" requirements do not,
however, fully appear in the Southard and Fairfield Gardens cases.
The court's dismissal of the former case did not entirely deprive
plaintiff of declaratory relief because his controversy with the vendee
could be made the basis for a new declaratory action. While no con'On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania dismissed it re
Sterrett's Estate, 300 Pa. 116, 15o Atl. 159 (1930), for want of a controversy,
notwithstanding the similarity between that case and a trustee's bill for advice.
'IMuskegon Heights v. Danegelis, supra note 57, at 265, 235 N. W. at 84.
6'Ibid.
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troversy had yet occurred in the Fairfield Gardens case, the facts of
the case indicated that a dispute could easily be brought about. Not
only plaintiff vendor but also his prospective vendee desired a judgment which authoritatively answered the question whether or not
plaintiff 'could lawfully erect a hospital on his property. Indeed, it was
the vendee'who had raised this question. Here, then, existed the
foundation for a friendly suit between the vendor and his vendee similar to the one presented in the Karihercase. 61 Merely by denying the
vendor's right to build a hospital on his property, the vendee could
make possible a declaratory action in which the doubts harassing both
parties might be removed. The fact that two parties desired a declaratory judgment thus made possible a friendly controversy and mitigated
the severity of the court's action in dismissing the Fairfield Gardens
case.
But what relief can be expected by a person who has no such friendly opponent to dispute his rights? Lyman v. Lyman both affords the
answer to that question and completely illustrates the pernicious effects of the "actual controversy" limitation. Notwithstanding the serious clouds on plaintiff's right and the presence of parties having adverse interests, the absence of a dispute operated to deprive him of
declaratory relief. The opinion, it is true, suggested that he might secure a declaration if some hypothetical prospective purchaser denied
his title. This purchaser, like the vendee in the Fairfield Gardens
case, would have an interest in plaintiff's securing a judgment because
the validity of his own purchase would depend upon the soundness of
plaintiff's title. Since a declaration would give him security, the purchaser could be expected to make the "denial of right" necessary to
confer upon plaintiff a cause of action for declaratory relief. This
friendly suit, however, might remain forever impossible, because
plaintiff might never attempt to sell the property. In that eventuality,
he could obtain no declaratory relief unless the possible remaindermen
controverted his title. But the remaindermen, unlike the prospective
vendee, had no pressing need for a declaration of the plaintiff's rights
in the land. On the contrary, they might prefer to wait indefinitely for
an adjudication of the question existing between themselves and the
plaintiff. Parties so situated might, in truth, intend to deprive the
plaintiff of declaratory relief altogether in order to force him either
to forego the exercise of his rights or to exercise them at the peril of
a future executory action. Adverse parties, hoping to mulct a plaintiff
for damages in an executory action, would be careful not to dispute
his rights and thus give him grounds for a declaratory action in which
'Vide supra pages

19, 20.
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the rights of all parties would be fixed and the possibility of future
wrongs removed.
Although the Lyman case does not, in fact, present adverse parties
with such hostile intentions, it illustrates a grave difficulty arising from
the "actual controversy" requirement. It demonstrates that, in the absence of a friendly disputant, the party whose rights are clouded by
doubts remains absolutely at the mercy of the adverse parties so long
as courts insist upon a controversy as the only ground for declaratory
relief. Because such a party must waitiuntil his rights have been disputed, he is powerless in the face of a party of adverse interest whose
failure to controvert springs from a hostile, inequitable motive. In insisting upon an "actual controversy," courts have forgotten that the
absence of controversy, in the sense of a verbal dispute, may reveal
more real hostility between the parties than its presence. Indeed, nothing shows the absurdity of this limitation better than a comparison between the friendly disputes involving a vendor and vendee which meet
the "controversy" requirement and the situation of hostility here envisaged, which the limitation renders non-justiciable.
The difficulty thus arising from the limitation could, of course, be
mitigated by giving the adverse parties the alternative of "denying"
plaintiff's rights, thus submitting the matter to declaratory adjudication, or of being thenceforth estopped from controverting them. Thus,
the mere fact of defendant's silence in the face of plaintiff's "assertion
of right" would bar the former from denying those rights in a future
suit. But, obviously, when a declaratory action has been dismissed for
want of a controversy, nothing on the record prevents the defendants
from advancing hostile claims in a future suit. The judgment of the
court, in fact, has no operation upon the substantive rights of the
parties, for it merely announces that the court will not, in the existing
action, declare those rights. There remains, of course, the broad doctrine of equitable estoppel which might be used to obviate these difficulties. Courts, impressed with the injustice inherent in the situation
herein envisaged, might decide that equity and good faith prevented
defendants, who had made no objection to plaintiff's claim of rights,
from later controverting his rights in an executory action.
There is, however, no evidence that the courts will accept this line
of reasoning. Nothing in the Southard, Lyman, and Fairfield Gardens
cases points to such a solution of the difficulty. Indeed, the courts seem
not to have recognized the existence of the problem. Moreover, were
this doctrine adopted, it would constitute a palliation of the injustice
rather than a complete remedy. The party forced to rely on estoppel
would, necessarily, be required to establish the fact of his own previous
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claim of right and of the opposing party's failure to dispute that claim.
These acts would have occurred out of court. Their proof would involve the presentation of evidence and a finding of fact by the court.
Obviously, the doctrine of estoppel, under these circumstances, gives
the party whose rights are merely clouded by doubts a degree of security decidedly less than that afforded by the doctrine of res judicata.
Only by res judicata could he be given the absolute security so necessary to the beneficial use of his rights.
The fact of the matter is that to give a party, situated as suggested
above, an adequate degree of protection involves nothing less than the
granting of declaratory judgments before a controversy has arisen between the parties. The party whose rights are clouded must be permitted to bring his action and join, as defendants, all adverse parties
irrespective of whether or not they have controverted his claim of
right. The courts must abandon the requirement of an "actual controversy" as a condition prerequisite to declaratory relief and allow
the plaintiff, by bringing his action, to force a controversy before the
court. The issues would thus be brought before the court, the rights
of the parties litigated and both parties, after having had their day in
court, would receive a binding declaration of their rights. If the adverse parties should assert hostile claims against the plaintiff in future
litigation, he would need to present no evidence to show estoppel. The
former judgment of the court, a matter of record, would constitute a
complete bar to such claims. The issues would have been already decided; the questions of right forever closed.
It may be urged, however, that the courts, in seeking thus to give
the plaintiff security, might commit a serious injustice against the adverse parties. The defendant in the ordinary actions coming before the
courts has committed or at least threatened to commit an act hostile
to plaintiff's rights. He is a wrong-doer, who meets retribution at the
hands of the court. Having injured the plaintiff, he may not complain
if the latter seeks redress through the processes of the law. But if the
"actual controversy" requirement be abolished, persons who are entirely innocent of any wrongful act may be made defendants in declaratory actions. In fact, such persons may not have even verbally
controverted plaintiff's claims. Why, it may well be argued, should
such a person be forced into litigation? Why should he be made to
bear the expenses and tribulations of a judicial trial merely because
the rights of another are uncertain, when he has done nothing to render those rights precarious? Granted that such declaratory relief may
be advantageous to the plaintiff (so the argument may run), does it
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follow that courts must close their eyes to the burden thus cast upon
the defendant?
This hypothetical argument possesses some merit in so far as it
demonstrates that the declaration might cast a grave burden upon the
defendant. We must, however, recognize two categories of defendants.
One class, although having adverse interests, does not in fact claim
any rights hostile to those of the plaintiff. Defendants of this class
need not litigate the matter at all. They need but appear in court and
disclaim, thereby saving themselves from an assessment of costs. By
so doing, they suffer no loss, for they claimed no rights, while at the
same time they give the plaintiff the security of res judicata, which he
requires. The other class comprises those who not only have adverse
interests but also claim rights which conflict with those of plaintiff.
These defendants are, as we noted, forced to litigate the matter on the
spot. But why should they not be required to do so? If the matter be
not litigated in the declaratory proceeding, it will be tried in an executory proceeding, "after the fact," with the present defendant in the
role of plaintiff. Unless the present plaintiff foregoes the exercises of
the rights which he claims, the question is not whether or not the matter shall be litigated, but merely when it shall be litigated.
Indeed, this entire question may be reduced to simple terms. In the
case of a conflict of rights between A and B, shall A or B determine
the exact time of the submission of the matter to a court? When the
declaratory action is available to "quiet" uncertain jural relations, A
may determine the time of trial by bringing a declaratory action before
exercising his asserted rights. If no declaratory judgment may be had,
or even if the declaration is strictly limited to cases of "assertion and
denial of right," B has the privilege of deciding when the courts shall
be invoked, subject, of course, to the statute of limitations. It follows,
therefore, that by allowing A to secure declaratory relief whenever he
chooses, the courts confer on him no greater privilege than that which
would be enjoyed by B, were there no declaratory judgment statute or
were A required to wait until B had "denied" his rights before bringing a declaratory action.
This, however, is merely a partial answer to the argument outlined
above. And, in truth, the mere fact that we have denominated the
power to determine the time of suit, a "privilege"-and few would undertake to say otherwise-forbids our leaving the argument at this
point. In strict justice, there can be no reason why either A or B
should have an absolute power to determine the time for invoking the
courts. Neither party is a wrong-doer, either in fact or theory. Consequently, there remains not the slightest shred of reason for giving
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either party an advantage over the other. On the contrary, every reason exists for consulting the interests of both with respect to the time
of trial.
The fact that the granting of a declaratory judgment rests in the discretion of the court makes such a result possible. When a declaratory
action has been commenced, the court may, with perfect propriety, inquire whether or not the defendant has an objection to a trial of the
matter at that time. If a valid objection be advanced, the court must
then balance that objection against plaintiff's need for declaratory relief and determine whether the action should, nevertheless, proceed or
whether justice requires that it be postponed. The sound discretion of
the court would thus control the time of suit and prevent whatever injustice to the defendants exists in the plaintiff's unrestrained power to
bring declaratory actions before the occurrence of a dispute.
It appears, therefore, the refusal to declare rights in case of doubt,
as contradistinguished from cases of controversy, constitutes a wholly
unnecessary and pernicious curtailment of the declaratory judgment's
usefulness. The beneficent, flexible use of this proceeding demands an
abolition of the "actual controversy" requirement and a recognition of
the true nature of the action as a kind of bill to remove clouds from all
legal relationships. At the present moment, statutory phraseology and
judicial precedents stand in the way of this clear-cut solution. The
remedy, therefore, lies in the direction of a reconstruction of the term
"actual controversy." Fortunately, the materials for this work are already at hand. The Supreme Court of Tennessee has brought forward
in the case of Miller v. Miller62 a definition of a controversy which
obviates the objections herein advanced. Speaking of the factual situations warranting declaratory relief, the court declared that "the only
controversy necessary to invoke the action of the court and have it
declare rights . . . is that the question must be real, not theoretical;
the person raising it must have a real interest and there must be someone having a real interest in the question who may oppose the declaration sought." 63
By accepting this definition of a "controversy," the courts would
achieve by indirection precisely the same result as might have been
directly effected by removing the requirement of a controversy. Indeed, the formula of the Miller case envisages a potential controversy
rather than an existing controversy. A plaintiff being in doubt concerning his rights may, under this definition, bring a declaratory action by asserting them against someone "who may oppose the declara'2Sitpra note io.
'Miller v. Miller, supra note io, at 487, 261 S. W. at 972.
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tion sought." It is not necessary that the defendant actually dispute
the plaintiff's claim. He need merely have an adverse interest in the
question, i.e., the legal right to oppose the declaration. The plaintiff
may secure a declaration if he can find a "proper contradictor, that is
someone presently existing who has a true interest to oppose the declaration sought."'6 4 Thus, the formula of the Miller case requires
merely that the parties have hostile interests in the question propounded. If the parties possess such interests, the manner in which
the question arose, whether by a dispute or by doubt, is of no particular significance.
It seems incontestable, therefore, that an adoption of this definition
would make the declaration available in cases of doubt even though
the statutes or precedents limit that proceeding to "cases of actual controversy." The question remains, however, whether or not the courts
will accept this solution. The doctrine of the Miller case represents a
broad, liberal conception of the function of the declaration. Against
that view is pitted judicial conservatism, the product of the judges'
experience in the daily adjudication of "actual controversies" in the
strict sense of that term. Because the greater portion of the litigation
before them involves a collision between the parties, or at least a
threatened collision, courts naturally view with a hostile eye any proceeding not presenting such elements. Indeed, we cannot state with
any degree of certainty that the courts will remain content with a
merely verbal dispute as proof of the hostility of the parties, for at
least in one case, Village of Grosse Pointe Shores v. Ayres, 65 the ex-

istence of such a dispute was deemed insufficient to warrant relief.
The Ayres case constitutes, in fact, an excellent example of the conservative views. Ayres and others, all residents of the plaintiff village,
dedicated land to the village for highway purposes. In the deeds of the
dedicated lands, the defendants incorporated provisions which specified the exact position of the proposed highway and of the water and
gas mains, and provided that if the village should violate any of the
provisions, the land should revert to the original owners. The plans
for the highway as finally adopted by the village provided that the
water and gas mains should occupy a position different from that specified in the deeds, although the highway itself conformed in every way
with those provisions. A dispute thereupon arose between the parties,
the village contending that none of the restrictive covenants were valid.
To settle this dispute, the village sought a judgment declaring all the
restrictive provisions void. In giving judgment, however, the court re"Supra note 29.
254 Mich. 58, 235 N. W. 829 (i931).
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fused to consider the question of the validity of the provisions affecting the position of the highway itself and confined itself to those covenants which dealt with the water and gas mains. The grounds put forth
to justify this discrimination were two-fold. In the first place, the
court asserted its incompetence to declare future rights. The second
reason had its basis in the fact that plaintiff village did not intend to
lay the highway contrary to the specifications and therefore-so concluded the court-no "actual controversy" existed with respect to the
highway provisions.
It may be noted, in passing, that plaintiff's asserted right to construct the highway contrary to the specification was not a future right
in the legal sense of that term. The essence of a future right may be
found in the fact that its possessor has absolutely no power to exercise the right until a future date. If the village had the right to ignore
the covenants, it could have exercised its right in the immediate present. The right in question, therefore, must have been a present right.
Certainly the village's right did not become a future right merely because its possessor had voluntarily refused to exercise it in the present.
Of more importance, however, is the fact that this case introduces an
additional element into the concept of an "actual controversy." No one
may deny that the dispute between the parties involved all the restrictions contained in the dedicatory deed. Ayres had denied the village's
right to disregard any of those provisions. Were an "assertion and
denial of right" the sole element of an "actual controversy", the actuality of the controversy with respect to each and every provision could
not be questioned. But, according to this case, there remains another
element. The party asking relief must intend to exercise immediately
the right which he seeks to have declared. If such intention be wanting,
there can be no "actual controversy."
This doctrine constitutes, in plain fact, a return to the conception of
a controversy contained in the Anway case. The requirement of an
"assertion and denial of right" guaranteed, as we have pointed out,
that there be a kind of collision between the parties somewhat similar
to those presented by executory actions. The rule of the Ayres case
requires in addition an actual wrong to have been threatened. For, if
A announces his intention to exercise a right, the existence of which
is disputed by B, the party of adverse interest, he in effect threatens to
wrong B. Thus, in the Ayres case, the village's avowed intention to
disregard the provisions governing the location of the water and gas
mains constituted, in the eyes of Ayres and his co-defendants, a threat
of wrong. No subtle analysis is required to show the similarity between
the circumstances necessary to give rise to the declaration, when thus
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limited, and those which constitute a cause of action for injunctive relief. In sober truth, the Ayres case, as it comes from the court's hands
closely resembles a proceeding for an injunction with the parties reversed. Thus, the rule of the case makes the declaration somewhat of
a counterpart to injunctive relief.
Here then is a conservative doctrine to be placed over against the
liberal formula of the Miller case. Whereas the latter requires merely
a potential controversy between parties of adverse interest, the former
requires a present dispute amounting to a threat of wrong. The rule of
the Miller case, by demanding, as a condition precedent to declaratory
relief, merely the existence of the factual basis for a controversy,
brings the declaratory action under the principles of the bill to remove
clouds, for in every situation of real doubt there lurks a potential controversy. On the other hand, the Ayres case obviously ignores these
principles and follows the conceptions proper only to executory actions. Thus, by following the former doctrine, the courts can mould
the declaratory action into a flexible remedy for doubts in legal relationships. By adopting the latter view, they can confine the declaration
within narrow bounds and curtail its usefulness. The final outcome
rests, therefore, in the discretion of the courts. The solution they adopt
will depend entirely on the extent to which they are dominated by the
conservative conceptions growing out of the every-day litigation before
them.
Only very tentative conclusions can, therefore, be drawn from our
survey. We can state that the simple issue of constitutionality no longer stands in the path of the declaratory action in the state jurisdictions. We can, perhaps, predict, with all due diffidence, that the Supreme Court of the United States will also sustain the constitutionality of the new federal declaratory judgment act. Certainly the Wallace
case, which points to the existence of a "real controversy" as the sole
criterion of justiciability, appears to be a clear precedent for upholding the validity of the declaratory judgment when limited, as in the
act, to "cases of actual controversy." The closing of the constitutional
question in the federal jurisdiction would, however, merely project upward a larger question, the question of the meaning of the term, "actual controversy." Thus, the Supreme Court would face a problem
which has been already faced by state courts.
If the views herein advanced be sound, this problem should never
have arisen. Had the analogy between the declaratory action and the
bill to remove clouds been recognized, the impropriety of the "actual
controversy" requirement would have become at once apparent. Unfortunately, judicial conservatism, dominated by a theory of judicial
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power which sees the mark of a case's justiciability in a present collision between the parties, forced this limitation. To the advocate of declaratory relief, the problem of the limitation's construction becomes,
therefore, the problem of obviating its unwelcome consequences and of
restoring the declaratory action to its full usefulness. In brief, the proponent of declaratory relief seeks a definition of the requirement which
will admit of the declaration's being administered under the principles
of the bill to remove clouds.
Such a result may be achieved by a general adoption of the formula
presented by the Miller case. By virtue of that definition, the declaratory judgment becomes automatically a remedy for doubts arising
from potentially adverse interests of other parties. It takes on its widest, most appropriate scope as a flexible means of administering preventive justice. This solution, however, involves the overthrow of
those conceptions of judicial power which produced the "actual controversy" requirement. It, therefore, must meet the vigorous opposition of established doctrine. Nevertheless, upon its success in overthrowing that doctrine depends nothing less than the widest usefulness of the declaratory action.

